Dear Media:

You don't understand anything about voting systems. Why not admit it, learn what you need to know -- and then help inform the public?

But no. Today, the NYT once again promoted the ludicrous idea [1] that attacks on voting machines didn't flip any elections in 2016.

The fact is, we don't know whether such attacks flipped elections, because (a) no one seriously has tried to find out; and (b) electronic voting systems make it extremely difficult to discover such attacks and determine their effects.

Let's concentrate on (b). Imagine you run a Russian spy agency, and Vladimir Putin has ordered you to install candidate X as President of the USA. You consider many tactics, including attacking voting systems. You peruse a map of swing counties, helpfully marked by voting system type:

Hmm, this first batch of counties use hand-filled paper ballots counted by hand. Maybe we can bribe the counters? Maybe we can add a few extra ballots to the ballot boxes, or take out ones containing votes for the opponent? Meh! Too many people to subvert for too little gain, and too much chance we'll get caught. Not going to risk my assets on this crap.

Some other counties use hand-filled paper ballots, but they tabulate them by machine. Now we're making some progress. Maybe we can subvert the tabulators? How hard would it be? This is a definite possibility. But if we swing the results too far, they'll think something's wrong, and they'll hand-count the paper ballots and find the attack. Damn! Still, it's worth looking into.

Lots of counties use direct-recording electronic machines. Now we're talking! If we spear-phish the vendor (like we did to John Podesta), then add a little software to flip some votes -- and maybe make machines in the opponent's strong areas freeze or slow down -- oh yes! Almost no one audits the results -- even if there's anything to audit (which there often isn't). No one will ever know! Plus, we can even make the machines move X up the ballot, or put the opponent near the bottom, or make it easier to select X, or harder to select anyone but X, or... Why didn't I think of this before? And those silly "paper trails" -- not one voter in 100 reads those, and even if they do, it'll look like a "glitch". Perfect!

Given the known Russian attacks on the 2016 Presidential election -- and the money and power at stake in every national election -- it would shock me if someone didn't attempt this attack. And it would greatly surprise me if they didn't succeed. But even the possibility should shock the media out of their entirely unwarranted complacency. America is at stake. Wake up!

[1] "Editorial: Combating a Real Threat to Election Integrity", New York Times, 7/9/2017, Section SR, page 10.